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Abstract 
 
In this paper we study how early-exit options, embedded in long-term procurement contracts which do not 
provide for sufficiently strong incentives against contract breach, can affect bidding behaviors in 
multidimensional procurement auctions and the parties' expected payoffs. We show first that bidders' payoff 
is lower when competing for contracts with unenforceable contract terms. Secondly, that neglecting the risk 
of opportunistic behavior by sellers can lead to contract awards that do not maximize the buyer's potential 
payoff. Finally, we make suggestions about how to mitigate potential misallocations, by pointing out the role 
of eligibility rules and competition among bidders. 
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1 Introduction
Premature termination of public procurement contracts, and other types of public-private part-
nerships, is not uncommon. An illustrative example is the rail franchise between Edinburgh and
London awarded in 2007 to National Express on the basis that it would pay the Department of
Transport £ 1.4 billion over seven and a half years. However, since passenger revenues proved to
be lower than expected because of the economic downturn, just two years later National Express
announced that it wanted to opt out the contract. In November 2009 the Department accepted to
terminate the franchise and received £ 120 million from the company. In evaluating the case, the
UK Parliaments Public Accounts Committee noted that "[...] the Department did not undertake
su¢ cient due diligence on the bid by National Express". In addition, by telling that the termina-
tion would not be held against the company if it bid for future franchises, "the Department has
potentially incentivised other holding companies with loss-making franchises to terminate [their
contract] as they know doing so [...] will not a¤ect their ability to compete for other contracts"
(UK Parliament - Public Accounts Committee, 2011).
Along with the increasing use of competitive procedures for public sector contracts, the auction
literature has expanded in recent years. Theoretical models, however, have largely focused on the
one-shot provision of a single item, in so doing overlooking the possibility that contractors could
breach contracts which instead require the supply of goods or services over an extended period of
time.
One interesting example of public-private agreements involving long-term obligations are con-
servation contracts, which have become quite popular in recent years as a means of procuring
environmental services, such as biodiversity maintenance, carbon sequestration, soil erosion con-
trol, ood water storage or visual amenities. Broadly speaking, these contracts commit landowners
to keep natural areas in their pristine state, or to remove cropland from production. In general,
contractors are also required to act proactively, in order to enhance environmental quality, by im-
plementing for example wildlife protection measures on enrolled forestlands and wetlands, or by
establishing permanent native grasses on set-aside cropland. In exchange, landowners receive a
payment ow for the direct and opportunity costs of conservation practices.
Traditionally, governments have o¤ered xed subsidies for compliance with a predetermined
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set of conservation activities. However, along with the expansion of environmental contracting,
interest in bidding mechanisms has grown, in order to increase the cost-e¤ectiveness, transparency
and political acceptance of environmental payments (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).
Competitive tenders for conservation contracts usually come in the form of multi-dimensional
auctions in which agents are required to make o¤ers on both price and environmental activities,
and bids are evaluated according to predened scoring criteria. Examples include the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) auctions employed in the USA after 1990, the BushTender Trial in
Australia and the Challenge Fund Scheme in UK.
As in other procurement literatures, conservation auction models are generally built on the
(implicit) assumption that service time commitments will be met (see for example Kirwan et al.,
2005; Claassen et al. 2008; Espinosa-Arredondo, 2008; Vukina et al., 2008; Wu and Lin, 2010).
Landowners, however, could nd it protable to terminate the contract when the opportunity
cost of compliance with conservation requirements proves to be higher-than-expected, because, for
example, of sharp rises of crop prices, increases in timber prices, or the increased demand of land
for housing or industrial uses.
Generally speaking, opportunistic behaviors by sellers may be discouraged by informal sanctions,
such as the threat of losing reputation and future business. However, the relatively limited role
of reputational incentives in exchanges between the government and the private sector (Kelman,
1990; Spagnolo, 2012) makes more compelling the need for formal remedies, which typically take
on the form of nancial "penalties".1 2 Even these contractual claims, however, can prove to be
ine¤ective in enforcing compliance, because of technical, legal, or other factors.
First, since contract provisions are typically established prior to launch the tender, contracting
agencies can nd it di¢ cult to tailor contractual penalties owing to the lack of precise information
on the value of the biddersoutside options.
1The term "penalty" is used here in a broad sense, to encompass both contractual provisions aimed at enforcing
compliance with contractual obligations (penalties stricto sensu) or at protecting the promisee from the expected
costs of breach ("liquidated damages" in the legal jargon).
2For example, in the USA, besides returning all the cost-share funds already paid, with interest, owners willing
to take their land out of the CRP program face a penalty of 25 per cent of rental payments received. The Secretary
of Agriculture, however, is allowed to release land from CRP without penalty, an option which has been exercised
twice, in 1995 and 1996 (Stubbs, 2013).
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Second, general legal principles can limit the freedom to stipulate payments for non-compliance
with contractual obligations. For example, in Common Law jurisdictions, payments, even though
mutually agreed, can be subsequently voided (in part or in their entirety) by courts if it appears
that they were designed to be a deterrent rather a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss that would
be su¤ered in the event of breach (DiMatteo, 2001).3
Third, governments can face political pressure to soft early termination fees. In the USA, for
example, agricultural associations have frequently lobbied for reducing payments for early release
of CRP acres, and in 2011 some Members of the Congress asked President Obama to release CRP
land without penalty for the purpose of grain production (Stubbs, 2013).
Finally, the e¤ectiveness of contractual claims can be threatened by costly litigation and in-
e¢ cient dispute settlement processes. For instance, institutional failures, leading to incomplete
contract enforcement, have been emphasized in recent works on programs aimed at reducing defor-
estation and degradation of tropical forests in developing countries (Palmer, 2011; Cordero Salas
and Roe, 2012; Cordero Salas, 2013).
When sellers do not face su¢ ciently strong incentives against breach of contracts, either because
of the lack of reputational incentives, or because of the intrinsic weakness of penalties or because
of the lack of credibility and the weak enforcement of contractual claims, bidders will compete for
contracts which, de facto, include an "early-exit option". The question addressed in this paper
is how this can a¤ect bidding behaviors in multidimensional auctions and the parties expected
payo¤s.
Our main contributions are the following. First, we show that bidderspayo¤ is lower when
competing for contracts which, either explicitly or implicitly, do not provide for enforceable time
commitments. Secondly, that neglecting the risk of opportunistic behavior by sellers can lead to
contract awards that do not maximize the buyers potential payo¤. Finally, we make suggestions
about how to mitigate potential misallocations, by pointing out the role of eligibility rules and
competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview
of the related literatures. In section 3 we set up the model. Section 4 illustrates the benchmark
3This explains why, for example, the CRP contract species that the fee due in the event of early release "shall
be due as liquidated damages [...] and not as a penalty" (USDA, 2013, § 10).
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case in which the contractual duration is enforceable. In section 5 we derive the equilibrium of
the auction game when bidders do not face su¢ ciently strong incentives against early-exit and in
section 6 we discuss the impacts of ignoring the risk of a premature termination of contracts and
possible remedies. We conclude in section 7. The Appendix contains the proofs omitted from the
text.
2 Related literature
This article is related to various literatures which have developed in a largely independent fashion.
The rst strand of literature is that on scoring auctions in which bidders compete on both
price and non-price (quality) dimensions.4 Though the guarantee of supply over the stipulated
contract period is generally considered to be one of the most important aspects in procurement, to
the best of our knowledge, the risk of premature interruption of supply has not been addressed in
the literature on multi-dimensional auctions. In his seminal paper, Che (1993) showed that, under
specic conditions on the cross partial derivatives of the cost function, an auction in which price
enters linearly into the scoring rule implements the optimal scheme by distorting quality downward
with respect to the e¢ cient level. A contribution of our paper is that it proves that Ches result
still holds even when bidders, facing on-going changes in outside conditions, incorporate into their
bidding strategies potential terminations of supply.
The second literature is the one on real options analysis. Rights, but not obligations, to invest
capital in productive assets have traditionally been traced back to collective opportunities, such as
the possibility to penetrate a new geographical market without barriers to competitive entry, or
to exclusive rights of exercise ("proprietary options") resulting from copyrights, patents, or from a
companys managerial resources or unique knowledge of a technological process which competitors
cannot replicate (Kester, 1984; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). Proprietary options
can also be embedded in public contracts, such as concessions for public utilities, oil and gas leases
or radio spectrum licenses. This for instance occurs when allottees have contractual discretion as
to when, if at all, to develop the lease or to supply the market by using the assigned spectrum
(Dosi and Moretto, 2010). However, even when contracts do not explicitly provide such discretion,
4See, for instance, Che (1993), Bushnell and Oren (1994) and Asker and Cantillon (2008; 2010).
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real options may emerge as a result of the contracting authoritys inability to enforce compliance
with contractual obligations (Dosi and Moretto, 2015). For instance, in a procurement context,
this can occur when contractors do not face su¢ ciently strong penalties against delays in project
implementation or, as in the case addressed in this paper, against early termination of supply.
A number of papers, using real option theory, have analyzed the value of managerial exibility
from the promisees perspective (see for example Ford et al., 2002; Ho and Liu, 2002; Garvin and
Cheah, 2004; You and Tam, 2006; Lo et al., 2007; DAlpaos et al., 2013). These works, however,
tend to overlook the feedback e¤ects of exibility on bidding behavior as well as the impacts in
terms of contract allocation which can be substantial (Kogan and Morgan, 2010). One of the few
exceptions is the paper by Dosi and Moretto (2015) that, viewing the imperfect enforcement of
contract terms as a source of real options, studies the e¤ects of the inability to enforce compliance
with delivery schedules on competitive bids for public works. The authors, however, limit their
analysis to homogeneous projects, where, unlike what we do here, bidding is restricted to the price
dimension.
A third strand of literature, broadly related to the present work, is that on auctions with
contingent payments.5 In particular, DeMarzo et al. (2005), by comparing the partiesexpected
payo¤s when bids are independent on future events ("cash auctions") with those achievable when
bids are securities whose value derives from the value of an underlying asset, showed that cash
auctions yield higher bidders payo¤s than security-bid auctions when the underlying asset is a
call-like ("growth") option. Even though our framework is di¤erent, in that the contract considered
here does not provide for subsequent price adjustments, our ndings are similar. In particular, we
show that when the contract duration is not enforceable, the impact on the bidderspayo¤ is similar
to the e¤ect of auctioning a contract with contingent payments, as it might occur if, for example,
subsidies for setting aside cropland were indexed to changes in agricultural prices.6
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the continuous-time setting that we use here is rather
common in the literature studying the principal-agent relationship under moral hazard and/or
adverse selection, when some asset (a natural resource, an investment project, etc.) owned by a
risk-neutral principal is contracted out to a risk-neutral agent. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006),
5See for example Hendricks et al. (2003), Board (2007), Haile et al. (2010), and for an excellent survey Skrzypacz
(2013).
6On payments for environmental services with an indexed component, see Engel et al. (2015).
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for instance, consider a continuous-time nancial contracting model where the agent may divert
cash for personal gain, while Sung (2005) and Sannikov (2007) present a continuous-time model of
dynamic agency with both moral hazard and adverse selection.
3 Model set up
Consider n  2 risk-neutral agents, each one holding one unit of a natural asset L that is currently
kept "idle", meaning that it does not provide the owners with any (relevant) private benet.
All parcels are suitable for producing one unit of a marketable good (good 1 ).7 This, however,
requires developing the asset (e.g. draining a wetland for agricultural use), by a¤ording a sunk
investment costK(i), where i 2 [l; u] denotes the agents innate managerial skills, withK < 0.8
Normalizing at zero operational costs, the investments returns depend on the exogenous output
price, which is assumed to evolve as follows:9
dp(t) = p(t)d(t); with p(0) = p0 (1)
where  is the instantaneous volatility and d(t) is the increment of the standard Wiener process
satisfying E0 [d(t)] = 0 and E0

d(t)2

= dt.10 The process (1), which is independent of i, is
common knowledge, and its realizations fp(t); t > 0g are publicly observed information.
Consider now a public agency (henceforth, "the buyer") that wishes to procure a public envi-
ronmental service (good 2 ) over a period of time (T ) pre-specied by the buyer.
In accordance with the additionality principle, we assume that the buyer is allowed to pay only
for the provision of services that would not have been supplied without public payments.11
7We normalize the quantity of good 1 at no cost in terms of robustness of our results.
8K(i) can also be thought as the present value of a ow of periodic xed costs k(i) = rK(i) to which the agent
commits once investment is undertaken.
9Note that if no arbitrage opportunities exist and the market is complete, the assumption of risk neutrality can
be relaxed. In this case, in order to provide an appropriate adjustment for risk, it su¢ ces to take expectations with
respect to a distribution of p(t) adjusted for risk neutrality. See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details.
10 In Eq. (1) we abstract from the drift in order to focus on the impact that uncertainty has on outcome of the
bidding process. Note, however, that by the Markov property of Eq. (1), our results would not be qualitatively
altered by using a non-zero trend for p(t). It can be also easily shown that Eq. (1) is consistent with the case
of a rm maximizing instantaneous operating prots under a Cobb-Douglas production technology (see Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, pp. 195-199).
11On the additionality principle, see for example Ferraro (2008).
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Provision of good 2 (e.g., soil erosion control) requires keeping L in its current state and un-
dertaking on-site conservation-oriented activities (e.g., native plant restoration, placement of bu¤er
strips, etc.) a¤ecting the quality and/or quantity of the environmental service.12 Denoting with g
the nal environmental outcome, the per-unit-of-time direct cost of service provision is dened as
c(g; i), with the following properties: c(0; i) = 0, cg > 0; cgg > 0, c  0 and cg < 0.13 14
Prior to bidding agents have private information about their own type i. Bidder i only knows
that j ; j 6= i is drawn from a common prior cumulative distribution F (i), with continuously
di¤erentiable density f(i) dened on a positive support [l; u]  R+.
The contract is awarded by a rst-score-sealed-bid auction. Specically, agents are solicited at
time t = 0 to bid on the environmental service (g > 0) and on the payment (b  0) required for
supplying g at each time period t 2 (0; T ]. O¤ers are then evaluated according to a scoring rule
S(b; g), announced prior to bid opening, and the winner is the bidder with the highest score.15
12Programs such as Payments for ecosystem services (PES) t within this category. Our model, however, can be
easily extended to situations, as the one addressed by Gulati and Vercammen (2006), where agents currently using a
resource depleting technology (A) are encouraged to switch to a resource conserving one (B). Basically, in this case,
the seller accepts to use B until date T , and then may switch back to A once the contract expires. Comparing this
case with ours, the main di¤erence is given by the initial state of the input asset used to provide the environmental
service, since the seller is required to suspend operations under technology A. In contrast, in our case, the seller is
asked not to exercise the option of adopting A until the contract expires.
13The cost function c(g; i) can be dened as:
c(g; i) = min
x0
wx s.t. '(x; i)  g
where w is the vector of input prices and '(x; i) is a strictly concave production function indicating the e¢ cient
level of environmental output for any given input vector x; with '  0.
14For a discussion of outcome vs. action-based conservation contracts, see Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi (2005),
Whitten et al. (2007), Gibbons et al. (2011) and White and Sadler (2011).
15Note that the simplifying assumption that each bidder holds only one eligible asset can be relaxed. The model
can, in fact, be easily extended to a multi-item procurement auction where each bidder holds multiple assets, as long
as each agent is allowed to bid only for one contract. In addition, most of our general results hold also in the case of
auctions with a discriminatory format, as long as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently high (see Krishna, 2012, Ch.
12, for a discussion on this point).
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In accordance to the literature on conservation auctions, we assume the following scoring rule:16
S(b; g) =
Z T
0
s(b; g)e rzdz = (v(g)  b)1  e
 rT
r
; (2)
where r is the discount rate and v(g) is a function mapping the social utility attached to g, with
vg(g) > 0 and vgg(g)  0.
Finally, we add the following assumptions.
 Assumption 1: The inverse hazard rate F (i)=f(i) is increasing in .
 Assumption 2: (g; i) = c(g; i)   rK(i) is positive and non-increasing in i for every
i 2 [l; u] and its derivative is bounded above.
 Assumption 3: At each time period g is veriable by all parties.
 Assumption 4: The buyer is able to commit to carry out the terms of the contract for its
entire duration.
Assumption 1 is standard in the auction literature (see for example Krishna, 2002). Assumption
2 is made in order to guarantee strict monotonicity of the scoring rule (Che, 1993). It implies that,
as  increases, the cost-e¢ ciency in the provision of good 2 dominates the cost-e¢ ciency in the
production of good 1. The underlying assumption is that, being good 1 a rather conventional prod-
uct, individual managerial skills play a relatively less important role in explaining cost di¤erences
across agents. Assumption 3, which is made to focus purely on the e¤ects of opportunistic behavior
leading to early exit, indicates that the buyer is able to monitor compliance with the promised
service and to stop rental payments should g fall below the contractual specications.17 Finally,
Assumption 4 rules out the possibility that the buyer could use, right after the auction (t > 0),
the information extracted through the bidding process to ask the contractor to increase e¤orts in
service provision or to lower the bid price.
16This functional form is consistent with the scoring rules used by Kirwan et al. (2005), Vukina et al. (2008) and
Wu and Lin (2010) to analyze the e¤ects of the Conservation Reserve Program. Notice that our framework can be
easily extended to the case where g(t) evolves deterministically at a given exogenous rate.
17Problems related to imperfect monitoring of conservation activities (or nal environmental outputs) have been
discussed in a series of papers dealing with agri-environmental contracts. See, among others, Giannakas and Kaplan
(2005) and Hart and Latacz-Lohmann (2005).
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4 Perfect enforcement
To get a benchmark case, we rst analyze the outcome of the bidding process when the contractual
duration is enforceable. Implicitly, we assume that the buyer does not face any constraints to
stipulate and to costlessly enforce arbitrarily large penalties against breach or, equivalently, that
the level of liquidated damages is such that agents bid knowing that they will never nd it convenient
to prematurely terminate the contract. This might, for instance, be the case when contractors were
required to refund all the payments already received, with interest, plus an exit fee (see footnote
25 for a formal proof).18
4.1 Preferences
Prior to bidding each agent contemplates the opportunity of developing L for producing good 1.
Denoting by bpi the market price triggering investment in such venture for the ith agent, the value
of the development project is given by:
b(i) = E0[e r bTi [Z 1bTi p(z)e r(z  bTi)dz  K(i)]] = E0[e r bTi ]( bpir  K(i)); (3)
where the optimal time of investment, bTi = infft  0 j p(t) = bpig, is a random variable, and E0 is
the expectation taken at the starting period t = 0 over the process fp(t); t  0g. Notice that Eq.
(3) represents both the winning bidders opportunity cost of keeping L in its pristine state and the
value of the asset for the bidders who will not be awarded the contract.
The optimal trigger bpi is the solution of the following problem:
V^ (i) = maxbTi E0[e
 r bTi ](bpi
r
 K(i)) = maxbpi (
p0bpi )(bpir  K(i)); (4)
where E0[e r
bTi ] = (p0=bpi) is the expected discount factor, and  > 1 is the positive root of the
characteristic equation  () = (2=2) (   1)  r = 0.19
18This is actually the approach adopted in the US Conservation Reserve Program for handling potential early outs.
The observed low number of CRP acres withdrawn earlier seems to conrm the deterrent e¤ect of this incentive
scheme.
19The expected present value E0[e r
bTi ] can be determined by using dynamic programming (see for example Dixit
and Pindyck (1994, pp. 315-316).
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Solving problem (4), we get:
bpi  bp(i) = [=(   1)]rK(i); (4.1)
V^ (i) = [ (p0)=(   1)]K(i)1 ; (4.2)
where  (p0) = [
p0=r
=( 1) ]
.
Thus, as standard in the real-option literature, the optimal trigger is given by the user cost of
capital, rK(i), corrected by the option multiple =(   1) which accounts for the irreversibility
and the uncertainty characterizing the decision to develop L for commercial use.
Notice that dV^ (i)=di > 0 and dbp(i)=di < 0. That is, the more e¢ cient is the agent, the
higher are the value of the asset and the opportunity cost of keeping L idle, and the lower is the
output price making protable to develop L for commercial use.
According to the additionality principle, public payments are allowed only for supporting private
decisions that would have not been made anyway. In our frame, additionality passes through the
actual threat of having L developed for commercial use. Hence, to ensure that all n bidders are
eligible for conservation funding, we add the following assumption, which says that, at the time of
bidding, market revenues are such that none of the bidders would continue to keep L idle without
conservation subsidies.20
 Assumption 5: p0 = bp(l):
By Assumption 5, given the properties of bp(i), our frame can be normalized by settingb(l) = 0. This operation, which does not a¤ect the underlying ranking of agents with respect
to the protability of developing L, implies that bidders can be ranked according to the following
reservation value: b(i) = p0
r
 K(i); for i 2 [l; u]; (3.1)
which is increasing in the cost parameter .
Now consider the winning bidder. The ex-post value of the contract is given by:21
20This assumption does not rule out the possibility that by the time (or before) the contract expires, a decrease
in market revenues may not make unprotable, even without public support, the use of the asset for an alternative
commercial purpose.
21More generally, the contract value is given by:
(bi; gi; i) = E0
(Z T
0
(bi   c(gi; i))e rzdz + e rTET [e r(
bTi T )](bp=r  K(i)))
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(bi; gi; i) = (bi   c(gi; i))1  e
 rT
r
+ (p0   rK(i))e
 rT
r
; (5)
where E0[pT ] = p0 is a straightforward implication of the Markov property of the di¤usion process
(1).22
By subtracting Eq. (3.1) from Eq. (5), we get:
(bi; gi; i)  b(i) =
8<: [(bi   c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]
1 e rT
r ; for i 2 (l; u];
(bi   c(gi; i))1 e rTr ; for i = l:
(6)
Hence, the sellers pay-o¤ (accounting for the reservation value) is given by the di¤erence be-
tween the present value of rental payments (net of the direct cost of performing gi) and the op-
portunity cost of not developing the asset until the expiration of the contract. Notice that, by
Assumption 5, the latter is null for the agent having the highest development cost (l).
4.2 Equilibrium strategy
Given the information available at time t = 0, each agent will choose the optimal bidding strategy
by maximizing the following functional:
(Si) = (bi; gi; i)  Pr(of win/Si) + (0; 0; i)  (1  Pr(of win/Si)); (7)
where Pr(of win/Si) is the probability of winning the auction, conditional on the reported score
Si(bi; gi), and (0; 0; i) = b(i) is the reservation value.
Hence, with probability Pr(of win/Si), agent i will be entitled to receive a ow of net payments
worth (bi   c(gi; i))(1   e rT )=r, plus the value of developing the asset at the expiration of the
contract, e rT [(p0=r) K(i)]. Instead, with probability (1 Pr(of win/Si)), the agent will simply
get the reservation value (0; 0; i) = b(i)  0.
that is, the present value of the ow of rental payments, bi, minus direct costs, c(gi; i), accruing up to T (rst term),
plus the value attached at T to the option to invest in the production of good 1 (second term). Note that by using
the stochastic discount factor ET [e
 r( bTi T )] we are also accounting for the likelihood of having pT  bpi. However,
given the information available at t = 0, by the law of iterated expectations and Assumption 5 such option is always
in the money and the above expression reduces to:
(bi; gi; i) = (bi   c(gi; i))1  e
 rT
r
+ (E0[pT ]  rK(i))
e rT
r
22See for example Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 71-74).
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Agents participate in the auction only if the following individual rationality constraint holds:
(Si)  b(i)  0: (8)
Since agents bid knowing that T is enforceable, the probability of winning, Pr(of win/Si), is
equivalent to Pr(of win/si), where si is the instantaneous score. Thus, using (6), we can rearrange
(8) and dene agent is objective function as follows:
W (bi; gi; i) = f[(bi   c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  e
 rT
r
)gPr(of win/si): (9)
The solution of the bidding game is as follows:
Proposition 1 When the contract duration is enforceable, for any nite number of bidders n it
will always exist an equilibrium in symmetric and strictly increasing strategies s(i) characterized
by:
i) the environmental output:
g(i) = argmax [v(gi)  c(gi; i)] (10)
with dg(i)=di =
cg(g(i); i)
vgg(g(i))  cgg(g(i); i) > 0;
for all i 2 [l; u];
ii) the bidding function:
b(i) = c(g(i); i) + (p0   rK(i)) 
Z i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx; (11)
iii) the expected prots:
W (i) =  
Z i
l
(x)
1  e rT
r
F (n)(x)dx; (12)
where (x)  c(g(x); x)  rK(x) < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The bid service in (10) can be easily determined by using Ches Lemma 1.23 This result allows
us to illustrate the agents bidding strategy by determining the score si and the output (quantity
23Note in fact that, once secured the enforcement of the contract duration T , our quasi-linear scoring rule is
consistent with the frame developed in Che (1993, pp. 671-672).
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or quality) level gi. Note also that since T is enforceable, the buyers total payo¤ simply comes
from the instantaneous score, s(i) = v(g(i))  b(i). Therefore, the auction e¢ ciency is ensured
by showing that ds(i)=di > 0 (see Appendix A.1).
Eq. (11) shows that the bid price covers both the direct cost of performing the promised
environmental service, c(g(i); i), and the opportunity cost of not developing L for commercial use,
(p0 rK(i)). Moreover, agents must be compensated by information rents,  
R i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx.
As standard in the auction literature, no rents will be paid to the least cost-e¢ cient agent, i.e.
b(l) = c(g(l); l) + (p0   rK(l)).
5 Non-enforceable contract duration
Now suppose that the seller does not face su¢ ciently strong penalties against contract breach.
As already argued, this can be attributed either to the lack of reputational incentives, or to the
weakness of contractual penalties, or to the weak enforcement of contractual claims. For the sake of
simplicity, here we simply assume that the seller does not face any (credibly-enforceable) penalty for
early exit.24 In other words, bidders bid knowing that, should an attractive outside option arise,
they can terminate the contract at the only cost of losing from that time onward conservation
payments. As shown henceforth, this implies that, unlike the previous case, bidding strategies will
be a¤ected by endogenous timing considerations.
5.1 Preferences
As above, prior to bidding, each agent contemplates the opportunity of developing L, which is
worth b(i) as dened by Eq. (3.1).
Now consider the winner. Denoting by pi the optimal threshold for developing L, the ex-post
value of the project is given by:
(bi; gi; i) = E0[
Z Ti
0
(bi   c(gi; i))e rzdz + e rTi(
Z 1
Ti
p(z)e r(z Ti)dz  K(i))]
= (bi   c(gi; i))1  E0[e
 rTi ]
r
+ (pi   rK(i))
E0[e
 rTi ]
r
; (14)
24Note, however, that the model can be easily extended, to include a probability-based penalty for early exit,
provided the expected penalty for breach does not exceed the sellers exit-option value (see Dosi and Moretto, 2015).
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where Ti = infft  0 j p(t) = pi g is the optimal time for breaching the contract. The rst term in
Eq. (14) is the expected net present value of conservation payments, while the second term is the
expected net present value of switching to the production of good 1.25
By rearranging Eq. (14), the sellers optimal trigger is given by the solution of the following
problem:
V (bi; gi; i) = max
Ti
E0[e
 rTi ]
pi   [(bi   c(gi; i)) + rK(i)]
r
= max
pi
(
p0
pi
)
pi   [(bi   c(gi; i)) + rK(i)]
r
: (15)
where E0[e rTi ] = (p0=pi )
 < 1. In (15) the term in squared brackets represents the cost of
switching to the production of good 1, which, besides the direct cost, rK(i), must also account for
the forgone net rental payments, bi   c(gi; i).
Solving problem (15), we get:
pi  p(bi; gi; i) =

   1[(bi   c(gi; i)) + rK(i)]; (15.1)
V (bi; gi; i) = [ (p0)=(   1)](bi   c(gi; i)
r
+K(i))
1 : (15.2)
Subtracting b(i) from Eq. (14) yields the value attached to having the contract awarded:
(bi; gi; i)  b(i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
[(bi   c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1 E0[e
 rTi ]
r +
+(pi   p0)E0[e
 rTi ]
r for i 2 (l; u]
(bi   c(gi; i))1 E0[e
 rTi ]
r + (p

i   p0)E0[e
 rTi ]
r ; for i = 
l:
(16)
Comparison between Eq. (6) and Eq. (16) points out the value of the managerial exibility
embedded in the opportunity of early-exit. It also shows that the lack of enforcement of contract
terms alters the sellers expected payo¤, namely, by lowering the opportunity cost of participating
to the conservation program.
5.2 Equilibrium strategy
Suppose the buyer ignored the risk of opportunistic behavior by the seller and, as above, ranked
bids on the basis of the instantaneous score s(bi; gi), by assuming that T will be obeyed.
25Notice that if, in the event of early exit (Ti < T ), the buyer imposed the repayment of the whole funds already
paid:
(bi; gi; i) = E0[
Z Ti
0
 c(gi; i)e rzdz + e rTi(
Z 1
Ti
p(z)e r(z Ti)dz  K(i))] < b(i)
In this case, none of the bidders would nd it protable to prematurely terminate the contract.
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Therefore, bidders will make their bids by maximizing the following functional:
(si) = (bi; gi; i)  Pr(of win/si) + (0; 0; i)  (1  Pr(of win/si)); (17)
where (0; 0; i) = b(i) is the reservation value, and agents will participate in the auction only if
the individual rationality constraint holds, i.e. (si)  b(i).
Using Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), bidder is objective can be dened as follows:
W (bi; gi; i) = f[(bi   c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi ]
r
+
+(pi   p0)
E0[e
 rTi ]
r
gPr(of win/si): (18)
The solution of the bidding game is as follows.
Proposition 2 When the contract duration is not enforceable, for any nite n it will always exist
an equilibrium in symmetric, strictly increasing strategies s(i), characterized by:
i) the environmental output g(i) (dened by Eq. (10)),
ii) the bidding function:
b(i) = c(g(i); i) + (p0   rK(i)) +
 
R i
l
(x)
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx+ (p(i)  p0)E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r
1 E0[e rTi(i)]
r
; (19)
iii) the expected prots:
W (i) =  
Z i
l
(x)
1  E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)dx; (20)
where, by (8), W (l) = 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Note, rst, that the bid service is equal to that o¤ered under enforceable contract terms. This
is an important result which allows extending the use of Lemma 1 by Che (1993) also to the case of
contracts with non-enforceable duration (see Appendix A.2). Hence, once secured its monotonicity,
i.e. ds(i)=di > 0, the use of the instantaneous score still allows to select the most e¢ cient
(least-cost) agent.
The second remark concerns the bid price which, as above, covers both the direct and op-
portunity costs of conservation practices. However, comparison of Eq. (11) with Eq. (19)
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shows that when the contract duration is not enforceable, the bid price is lowered by the term
(p(i)   p0)E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r , which accounts for the potential gains associated with early-exit.
26 In
other words, bidders will bid more "aggressively" when they do not face enforceable project dead-
lines.
Clearly, the magnitude of the bid reduction will depend on the uncertainty about the prof-
its resulting from putting L into commercial use. In fact, it is easy to show that:  ! 1,
E0[e
 rTi(i)]! 0 for all i. That is, the higher is the uncertainty about market prots the lower is
the di¤erence between the bid price with and without contract enforcement, because the todays
value to develop L tends to vanish as uncertainty increases.
Since information rents are null for agent l, we get:
b(l) = c(g(l); l) + (p0   rK(l))  p0 E0[e
 rTi(l)]
   (1  E0[e rTi(l)])
< b(l); (19.1)
from which it is easy to show that [=(   1)](b(l)   c(g(l); l) + rK(l)) = p(l) > p0. In
other words, the managerial exibility, spurred by the non-enforcement of contract terms, tends to
intensify the competition among the bidders.
In light of these results, let us analyze the e¤ect of managerial exibility upon the parties
individual payo¤s.
Let us rst consider the seller.
Proposition 3 Whatever is T : (i) the rental payment is lower when the contract duration is not
enforceable, b(i) < b(i); (ii) the sellers expected payo¤ is lower when the contract duration is not
enforceable, W (i) < W (i), unless Ti > T , in which case W (i) = W (i).
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The rst result is consistent with other ndings, such as those of Spulber (1990), who pointed
out that, in the absence of enforcement, the most e¢ cient (low-cost) bidders will be forced to bid
low in order to preserve their chances of winning. This, in turn, raises the probability of breach
of contracts. Unlike Spulber, however, we nd that the possibility of adjusting the service period
allows preserving the e¢ ciency of the bidding process. In other words, the auction does not fail to
allocate the contract to the bidder having the lowest cost of undertaking conservation activities.
26Notice that both the information rents and the gains associated with contract breach are annualized by the term
(1  E0[e rTi(i)])=r.
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The second result states that bidders expected payo¤ is higher when facing an enforceable
contract deadline, since the potential benets, stemming from the early-exit option, are outweighed
by the stronger bid competition spurred by the non-enforceability of contract terms.
This result conforms with the ndings of the literature on security-bid auctions. In fact, when
the contract duration is enforceable, bidders bid knowing that, upon winning, they will give up the
opportunity to develop L for T time periods. By taking the buyers perspective, this is equivalent to
purchasing a call-like ("growth") option by a cash auction, by paying a price which in our framework
takes on the form of a ow of rental payments (covering also the direct costs of environmental quality
enhancements).
On the other hand, when T is not enforceable, the price received for selling the growth option
also includes the option to prematurely terminate the contract. The inclusion of this last element
in the bid price makes, de facto, state-contingent the value attached to the contract. Thus, not
surprisingly, the value accruing to the seller is lower than that achievable under an only-cash auction.
6 The buyers payo¤ and the risk of opportunistic behavior
6.1 The buyers payo¤
When the contract duration is not enforceable, the buyers total expected payo¤ is given by:
S(i) = s(i)
1  E0[e rTi(i)]
r
; (21)
where T is the sellers optimal time for breaching the contract.
Since T  T , allocating the contract on the basis of the highest instantaneous score s(i) might
not be the best choice for the buyer, because the winner (least-cost agent) could be more prone
than others to early-exit.
This becomes clear if we take a closer look at the derivative of Eq. (15.1) with respect to the
bidderstypes:
dp(i)
di
=   
   1((i) +
ds(i)
di
): (22)
Since (i) < 0 and ds(i)=di > 0, the sign of dp(i)=di is ambiguous. In other words,
higher values of  can either translate into an increase, or a reduction of the optimal trigger for
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breaching the contract. In the latter case, the combination of high instantaneous net benets and
a short service period can turn out not being the one giving the buyer the highest total payo¤.
Notice that, in our framework, by Assumption 5 ("additionality"), all losing bidders will develop
L for commercial use by a¤ording a sunk capital cost. Hence, in case of early exit by the winner,
the possibility of procuring the service contractualized in the rst place by running a new auction
with the same agents is ruled out.
6.2 Accounting for the risk of opportunistic behavior
The risk of not selecting the agent providing the highest potential payo¤ could be avoided if the
buyer: (i) exploited the information gathered through the bidding process and (ii) used the total
expected payo¤, S(i), rather than the instantaneous score, s(i), to allocate the contract.
This would come at no cost in terms of auction e¢ ciency, provided we introduce the following
assumption on information rents which strengthens Assumption 1.
 Assumption 6:  (i)(F (i)=f(i)) is increasing in i and is bounded above by (n  
1)=[(1  E0[e rTi(i)])=r] for each i 2 [l; u]
Notice that if (i)  [c(g; i)  rK(i)] is concave in i, Assumption 1 would su¢ ce for having
 (i)(F (i)=f(i)) increasing in i. This, for instance, corresponds to the well-known su¢ cient
conditions (i.e., Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing and monotonicity conditions) for implementing the
optimal contract in a static framework (see, for example, Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984 and Fuden-
berg and Tirole, 1991).
In our dynamic frame, however, the standard conditions do not ensure the monotonicity of
T (i) and, therefore, the monotonicity of S(i). In fact, the information rents for the most e¢ cient
agents might be so high that they can competitively bid on the instantaneous score and win the
auction, even though there might be other bidders able to ensure a longer service provision and, as
a whole, higher total benets to the buyer.
Hence, the risk of opportunistic behavior calls for a restriction not just on (i)(F (i)=f(i)),
but on both T (i) and (i)(F (i)=f(i)). In fact, by rearranging equation Eq. (22) as follows
(see Appendix A.4):
dp(i)
di
=

   1(i)[(n  1)
f(i)
F (i)
W (i)
dW (i)=di
  1] (22.1)
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it can be noticed that a su¢ cient condition for dp(i)=di > 0 is that:
(i)
1  E0[e rTi(i)]
r
F (n)(i) + f
(n)(i) > 0 for all i 2 [l; u] (22.2)
This condition is satised by Assumption 6, which represents the minimum level of adjustment
required for meeting the monotonicity condition in the presence of opportunistic sellers contem-
plating a potential early-exit.27
The following proposition captures this result.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 6, for any nite n it will always exist an equilibrium in sym-
metric strictly increasing strategies s(i) with a non-decreasing optimal expected service period in
i, that is, dS(i)=di > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Note that the regularity condition imposed by Assumption 6 is a su¢ cient (not necessary)
condition for the equilibrium existence. For instance, should the condition not be met in a subset
of the space [l; u], the solution in Proposition 2 could still constitute an equilibrium, since there
can be a value ^ 2 [l; u] beyond which, despite dp(i)=di  0, dS(i)=di > 0 for every i
2 [l; u] (see Appendix A.4). In this case, even though not ensuring the longest service provision,
the least-cost agent would provide the buyer with the highest total payo¤, by compensating the
shortening of service period with higher instantaneous benets.
6.3 Competition and eligibility rules
Proposition 4 implies that a strong competition for winning the contract reduces the risk of not
selecting the agent providing the highest potential payo¤to the buyer. Otherwise, when competition
is relatively low, the buyer could still get the highest expected payo¤ by restricting eligibility for
conservation payments.
To clarify this statement, consider the following example. Suppose that the sunk cost for
developing L for commercial use is K() = u   , the private cost of environmental proactivity
27Sung (2005) presents a similar condition in a continuous-time agency model, with both adverse selection and
moral hazard, where the optimal contract is linear in the e¤ort. Note, however, that condition (22.2) is more general,
since it accounts for the non-linearity of the optimal contract (i.e., the bid function) in the level of "e¤ort" (i.e., the
contract duration T ).
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is c(g; ) = (g2=2)   g(   l), and the instantaneous social benet is v(g) = g. Moreover, for the
sake of simplicity, suppose that the agent-types are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, that is,
F () =  and f() = 1.
Hence, by Eq. (10), we get:
g() = 1 +   1 (23)
As shown in Appendix A.4, for the case of a trendless geometric Brownian motion, Assumption
6 is implied by the following condition:
()(F ()=f()) > r(n  1) (24)
where () = r   g() < 0 is decreasing in .
Substituting Eq. (23) into condition (24) and rearranging we obtain:
Q(;n)  (1 +    r)   r(n  1) < 0 (24.1)
Notice that, for any n, Q(;n) is increasing in  in the interval [0; 1], with Q(0) =  r(n   1)
and Q(1) = 2  rn.
Denoting by
 !
 the solution of the equation Q(
 !
 ;n) = 0, this is given by:
 !
 =
s
1  r
2
2
+ r(n  1)  1  r
2
where
 !
  1 for n  2=r:
Hence, as long as the number of bidders is relatively high (i.e. n  2=r), no restrictions on the
eligibility rules are needed in order to ensure that dS(i)=di > 0 over the entire range [0; 1].
On the other hand, if competition is relatively low (i.e. n < 2=r), the buyer would increase
the total payo¤ by restricting the range of eligible agents, namely, by excluding from award those
belonging to the subset [
 !
 ; 1].
7 Final remarks
Like other public procurement initiatives, contracts providing payments for preserving and enhanc-
ing natural assets generally require long-term commitments. Contractors, however, can nd it
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protable to breach the provision of environmental services when conservation compliance costs in-
crease. While this does not necessarily have to lead to early-exit, this possibility can be exacerbated
by the lack of su¢ ciently strong incentives against premature terminations of supply.
The question addressed in the paper is how nested termination options can a¤ect bidding
behavior and the partiesindividual payo¤s in procurement auctions where contractors are selected
on the basis of both the promised output and the required payments.
The novelty of our model, with respect to the previous literature on scoring auctions, is that
agents can adjust their bidding strategies by exploiting the managerial exibility spurred by the lack
of incentives against contract infringements. This implies that, unlike when the project deadline is
enforceable, bidding strategies will be a¤ected by endogenous timing considerations.
A rst result of the paper is that procurement contracts embedding early-exit options do not
translate into higher expected payo¤s for the sellers. This is because, in a competitive environment,
the potential benets, stemming the opportunity to terminate the contract, are outweighed by the
stronger bid competition spurred by the lack of enforcement of time commitments. Hence, besides
increasing the risk of failure of conservation programs, the weak enforcement of contract deadlines
may not even be in the contractorsbest interest.
A second result is that failure to account for the risk of opportunistic behavior could lead to
the choice of contractors who will not ensure the highest payo¤ to the buyer. In the specic case
of conservation contracts, this possibility relies on the correlation between the cost of undertaking
conservation activities and the opportunity cost of not exploiting land for commercial uses.
If costs are negatively correlated, that is, if agents that are able to more e¢ ciently exploit the
asset for commercial use are also able to undertake conservation activities at lower costs, the most
e¢ cient bidders, while providing the buyer with the highest instantaneous net benets, can be
more prone than others to early exit. Hence, the combination of higher instantaneous payo¤s and
shorter service periods can turn out not being the one giving the buyer the highest total value.
The paper makes suggestions which may contribute to avoid such potential bias in contract
allocation. A main policy implication of our paper is that when, for whatever reasons, contracting
agencies cannot rely on su¢ ciently strong and credible incentives against premature termination
of contracts, they should "internalize" the risk of early-exit.
In practice this means exploiting the information gathered through the auction process, in
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order to assess, and include in bid evaluation, the bidders actual prospective compliance. As
shown in the paper, this would not a¤ect the auctions allocative e¢ ciency, so long as the number
of bidders is su¢ ciently high to downsize the most e¢ cient agentsinformation rents. Otherwise,
when competition is relatively low, it might be protable for the buyer to restrict the range of
eligible agents, by excluding from award those with relatively high opportunity costs of compliance
with conservation requirements.
A Appendix
A.1 Proposition 1
In spite of being quite standard in the auction literature, we include the following proof for the
readers convenience. Consider a common prior cumulative distribution F () with continuously
di¤erentiable density f() dened on a positive support  = [l; u]  R+; where the lowest value
l is such that l = inf [ : f() > 0] and the highest value is u = sup [ : f() > 0]. Now consider
the agent is bidding behavior. It is immediate to note that the maximization of the objective
in (9) is equivalent to maximize the instantaneous expected net payo¤, i.e. [(bi   c(gi; i))  
(p0   rK(i))] Pr(of win/si), and that (bi   c(gi; i))   (p0   rK(i)) must be non-negative to
guarantee a positive expected payo¤ (otherwise, winning the auction would never be protable).
Assume that all other bidders use a strictly monotone increasing bid function s(j), i.e., s(j) :
[l; u] ! [s(u); s(l)] 8j 6= i. Since, by assumption, s(i) is monotone in [l; u], the probability
of winning by bidding s(i) is Pr(s(i) > s(j) j 8j 6= i) = Pr(j < s 1(s(i)) j 8j 6= i) =
F (s 1(s(i)))n 1 = F (i)n 1  F (n)(i).
The type reported, ~i, by agent i solves the following problem:
W (i; ~i) = max
~
[(b(~i)  c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  e
 rT
r
Pr (of win/si)
= max
~
[(b(~i)  c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  e
 rT
r
F (n)(~i);
where, by Che (1993, Lemma 1, p. 672), gi  g(~i) is determined by Eq. (10). This in turn implies
that:
W (i; ~i) = max
~
[(b(~i)  c(g(~i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  e
 rT
r
F (n)(~i); (A.1.1)
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Maximizing (A.1.1) and imposing the truth-telling condition ~i = i yield the following necessary
condition:
@ W (i; ~i)
@~i
j ~i=i = (
db(i)
di
  cg(g(i); i)dg(i)
di
)F (n)(i) +
+[(b(i)  c(g(i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]f (n)(i) = 0
or
(
db(i)
di
  cg(g(i); i)dg(i)
di
)F (n)(i) =  [(b(i)  c(g(i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]f (n)(i): (A.1.1b)
Integrating Eq. (A.1.1b) on both sides yields:Z i
l
(
db(x)
di
  cg(g(x); x)dg(x)
di
)F (n)(x)dx =  
Z i
l
[(b(x)  c(g(x); x))  (p0   rK(x))]f (n)(x)dx
Using integration by parts, one can easily show that:
b(i) = c(g(i); i) + (p0   rK(i)) 
Z i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx; (A.1.2)
where (x) = c(g(x); x)  rK(x) < 0 for x 2 [l; i]:
Eq. (A.1.2) can be used in order to dene the agents expected payo¤. That is:
W (i) =  
Z i
l
(x)
1  e rT
r
F (n)(x)dx+ W (l); (A.1.3)
where, by Eq. (8), W (l) = 0: Finally, by di¤erentiating Eq. (A.1.2) with respect to i and
rearranging, we obtain:
db(i)
di
= cg(g(i); i)
dg(i)
di
+ (n  1) f(i)
F (i)
Z i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx: (A.1.4)
Eq. (A.1.4) implies that b(i) is increasing in the cost of producing higher quality, g(i); and
decreasing in the information rent, i.e.   R i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx, to be paid.
By di¤erentiating Eq. (2) with respect to i and using Eq. (10) and Eq. (A.1.4), we can
immediately prove the assumed monotonicity of the optimal strategy s(i):
ds(i)
di
=  (n  1) f(i)
F (i)
Z i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx > 0: (A.1.5)
Finally, by using Eq. (A.1.5), we can easily prove the auction e¢ ciency. That is,
dS(i)
di
=
ds(i)
di
1  e rT
r
> 0: (A.1.6)
This concludes the proof.
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A.2 Proposition 2
Separability - Lets rst show that the following lemma holds:
Lemma 1 With a rst-score auction, the equilibrium output g(i) is chosen such that
g(i) = argmax [v(gi)  c(gi; i)] , for all i 2 [l; u]: (A.2.1)
This lemma can be easily shown by adapting to our case the proof provided by Che (1993, Lemma
1). Suppose that any equilibrium bid, (bi; gi), with gi 6= g(i); is dominated by an alternative bid,
(b0i; g
0
i) where b
0
i = bi + v(g
0
i)  v(gi); and g0i = g(i). It follows that:
bi   c(gi; i) = b0i   c(g0i; i) +

(v(gi)  c(gi; i))  (v(g0i)  c(g0i; i))

< b0i   c(g0i; i); (A.2.2)
which in turn implies p(bi; gi; i) < p0(b0i; g
0
i; i) and E0

e rTi

> E0[e
 rT 0i ].
Given Eq. (A.2.2), it can be easily shown that:
Si = (v(gi) bi)1  E0[e
 rTi ]
r
= (v(g0i) b0i)
1  E0[e rTi ]
r
< (v(g0i) b0i)
1  E0[e rT 0i ]
r
= S0i; (A.2.3)
or, equivalently, that Pr(of win/S0i) > Pr(of win/Si). Note also that (bi; gi; i)   b(i) (see Eq.
(16)) is increasing in h(bi; gi; i) = bi   c(gi; i) as:
@[(Si) (0; 0; i)]
@h
=
1  (p0p )(dp

dh
h
p )
r
> 0:
This in turn implies that:
W (bi; gi; i) = f[(bi   c(gi; i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi ]
r
+ (p   p0)E0[e
 rTi ]
r
gPr(of win/Si)
< f[(b0i   c(g0i; i))  (p0   rK(i))]
1  E0[e rT 0i ]
r
+ (p0   p0)E0[e
 rT 0i ]
r
gPr(of win=S0i)
=W (b0i; g
0
i; i): (A.2.4)
Finally, given Lemma 1, the equilibrium quality, g(i), can be determined using a standard set of
optimality conditions. Note that the problem is equivalent to (10). Hence, the same set of rst-
and second-order conditions holds also in this case (see condition (10.1)).
Bayes-Nash equilibrium - Lets now consider agent is bidding behavior. Assume that
all other bidders use a strictly monotone increasing bid function s(j), i.e., s(j) : [l; u] !
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[s(u); s(l)] 8j 6= i. Since, by assumption, s(i) is monotone in [l; u], the probability of winning
by bidding s(i) is Pr(s(i) > s(j) j 8j 6= i) = Pr(j < s 1(s(i)) j 8j 6= i) = F (s 1(s(i)))n 1 =
F (i)
n 1  F (n)(i).
It follows that agent i chooses his report ~i by solving the following problem:
W (i; ~i) = max
~
f[(b(~i)  c(g(~i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
+
+(p(~i; i)  p0)E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
gPr (of win/si)
= max
~
f[(b(~i)  c(g(~i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
+
+(p(~i; i)  p0)E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
gPr(s(~i) < max
j 6=i
s(j))
= max
~
f[(b(~i)  c(g(~i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
+
+(p(~i; i)  p0)E0[e
 rTi(~i;i)]
r
gF (n)(~i); (A.2.5)
where, by Lemma 1, gi  g(~i) is still determined by solving Eq. (10).
In order to derive the equilibrium strategies we could solve the ordinary di¤erential equation that
follows from the maximization problem in Eq. (A.2.5). However, di¤erently from the problem in Eq.
(A.1.1), this ordinary di¤erential equation, due to the presence of the optimal trigger p(~i; i) (and
the stopping time Ti(~i; i)), does not have a closed-form solution. We then determine the integral
equation that describe the utility W (i) by using the generalized Envelope Theorem provided by
Milgrom and Segal (2002, Theorem 2).28
Suppose that each agent sets y 2 Y to maximize  (y; !), where ! 2 [0; 1] and Y is arbitrary.
Denote the set of maximizers by y(!) := argmaxy  (y; !) and let 	(!) = supy2Y  (y; !):
Lemma 2 (Milgrom and Segal, 2002, Theorem 2). Suppose a)  (y; !) is di¤erentiable and
absolutely continuous in ! (ry); (b) j@ (y; !)=@!j is uniformly bounded (ry)(r!), and (c) y(!)
is nonempty. Then, for any selection y(!) 2 y(!),
	(!) =
Z !
0
@ (y(x); x)=@!dx+	(0): (A.2.6)
Now, let set ! = i and y = (~i; Ti) (or equivalently (~i; pi )), and apply Milgrom and Segals
theorem to the problem in Eq. (A.2.5). Note that: (i) W (i; ~i) is always di¤erentiable and
28See Board (2007, p. 329) for a similar application.
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continuous in i; (ii) the derivative of W is bounded because of Assumption 1; (iii) Eq. (15.1) says
that the stopping time attains its maximum for given bi and i. Since, by the revelation principle,
~i = i, it follows that:
W (i) =  
Z i
l
(x)
1  E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)dx+W (l); (A.2.7)
where, by Eq. (8), W (l) = 0.
Now, we can use Eq. (A.2.7) in order to dene the equilibrium payment. The equilibrium
payment, b(i), solves the following implicit equation:
[(b(i)  c(g(i); i))  (p0   rK(i))]1  E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r
+
+(p(i)  p0)E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r
=  
Z i
l
(x)
1  E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx; (A.2.8)
which can be rearranged as in Eq. (19). Although it is not possible to express b(i) in a closed
form, we may easily show some of its properties. In fact, by totally di¤erentiating Eq. (A.2.8) with
respect to i and rearranging, we obtain:
db(i)
di
= cg(g(i); i)
dg(i)
di
+ (n  1) f(i)
F (i)
R i
l
(x)
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx
1 E0[e rTi(i)]
r
: (A.2.9)
We notice that the payment, b(i), is increasing in the cost of producing higher quality and de-
creasing in the information rent to be paid. Finally, by using Eq. (A.2.9), it is easy to show that
the bid function s(i) is strictly monotone and increasing in i:
ds(i)
di
=  (n  1) f(i)
F (i)
R i
l
(x)
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx
1 E0[e rTi(i)]
r
> 0: (A.2.10)
It remains to show that Eq. (A.2.7) provides the unique local maximum for the problem in Eq.
(A.2.5). As usual, the uniqueness follows from the fact that the function in Eq. (A.2.7) is increasing
in i and has Eq. (8) as boundary condition. For showing that it is a maximum, it su¢ ces to prove
that si is incentive compatible:
W (i; i) W (i; ~i); (A.2.11)
for all (i; ~i) 2 [l; u]  [l; u]. We prove this by following the approach in adopted by Milgrom
(2004, Ch.4).
Lemma 3. The equilibrium strategy s(i) is incentive compatible if and only if equation (A.2.7)
holds and if s(i) is strictly increasing.
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Necessity. Since s(i) is strictly increasing then by the Monotonic Selection Theorem (Milgrom,
2004, Theorem 4.1), the function W (i; ~i) satises the strict single-crossing di¤erence condition.
Su¢ ciency. Suppose that W (i; ~i) satises the strict-single crossing di¤erence condition. If
s(i) is strictly increasing and Eq. (A.2.7) holds then by the Su¢ cient Theorem (Milgrom, 2004,
Theorem 4.2), s(i) is a local maximum for the problem in Eq. (A.2.5).
This concludes the proof.
A.3 Proposition 3
By rearranging Eq. (19) we obtain:
b(i) = c(g(i); i) + (p0   rK(i)) 
Z i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx M(i) = b(i) M(i); (A.3.1)
where M(i) =
  R i
l
(x)(E0[e
 rTi(x)] E0[e rTi(i)]) F
(n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx+E0[e rTi(i)](p(i) p0)
1 E0[e rTi(i)] .
Now, note that:
p(i)  p0 = p(i)  p0   
   1M(i); (A.3.2)
where p(i) =  1(b(i)  c(g(i); i) + rK(i)) =  1(p0  
R i
l
(x)
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx).
Substituting Eq. (A.3.2) into M(i) yields:
M(i) =  
(   1) R i
l
(x)E0[e
 rTi(x)]dx  E0[e rTi(i)]p(i)
(   1) + E0[e rTi(i)]
> 0: (A.3.4)
This in turn implies that:
b(i) < b(i); (A.3.5)
p(i) < p(i): (A.3.6)
It follows that:
s(i) = (v(g(i)  b(i)) > (v(g(i)  b(i))) = s(i): (A.3.7)
Finally, by direct inspection of (x)(1   E0[e rTi(x)]) and (x)(1   e rT ), it is also immediate
to show that if Ti(x) > T
W (i) > W (i): (A.3.8)
This concludes the proof.
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A.4 Proposition 4
By deriving p(i) with respect to i we obtain:
dp(i)
di
=   
   1((i) +
ds(i)
di
): (A.4.1)
As can be easily seen, substituting for ds(i)=di yields:
dp(i)
di
=

   1[ (i) + (n  1)
f(i)
F (i)
R i
l
(x)
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx
1 E0[e rTi(i)]
r
]
=

   1(i)[(n  1)
f(i)
F (i)
W (i)
dW (i)=di
  1] (A.4.2)
Since [=(   1)](i) < 0; it follows that dp(i)=di > 0 when the term into square brackets in
Eq. (A.4.2) is positive or, equivalently, if:
W (i) < F
(n)(i) (A.4.3)
Rearranging condition (A.4.3), we obtain:
 
Z i
l
((x)
1  E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x) + f (n)(x))dx < 0 (A.4.4)
which, by Assumption 6, is always satised. Further, note that, by the Jensens inequality,
E0[e
 rTi(x)] > e rE0[Ti(x)]. This implies that:
n  1
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
>
n  1
1 e rE0[Ti(x)]
r
This means that Assumption 6 is implied by the following condition:
 (x)(F (x)=f(x)) < n  1
1 e rE0[Ti(x)]
r
which, for the case of a trendless geometric Brownian motion, reduces to:29
 (x)(F (x)=f(x)) < r(n  1) (A.4.5)
Lets now check the properties of the scoring rule S(i). We notice that:
dS(i)
di
=
ds(i)
di
1  E0[e rTi(i)]
r
  s(i)
r
dE0[e
 rTi(i)]
dp(i)
dp(i)
di
: (A.4.6)
29By (1), E0[Ti(x)] =1. See (Dixit, 1993, pp. 54-57).
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This implies that S(i) is increasing in i when the following condition holds:
(n  1) f(i)
F (i)
> 
s(i)
iR i
l
(x)
1 E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (n)(x)
F (n)(i)
dx
E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r
(
dp(i)
di
i
p(i)
): (A.4.7)
This condition is always satised for dp(i)=di > 0.
We conclude by highlighting that dp(i)=di  0 is only a su¢ cient (not necessary) condition
for the existence of the equilibrium, i.e., S(i) monotone in i. By direct inspection of Eq. (A.4.2),
the sign of dp(i)=di depends on:
sign(
dp(i)
di
) = sign[  f(i)
F (i)
Z i
l
F (n)(x)d((x)
1  E0[e rTi(x)]
r
F (x)
f(x)
)dx] > 0: (A.4.8)
Since, by Assumption 6,  (x)1 E0[e
 rTi(x)]
r (F (x)=f(x)) is increasing, there exists 
l    i
such that:
sign(
dp(i)
di
) = sign[
f(i)
F (i)
F (n)(i)(()
1  E0[e rTi()]
r
F ()
f()
 (i)1  E0[e
 rTi(i)]
r
F (i)
f(i)
)]
(A.4.9)
from which it follows that limi>!l; dp
(i)=di > 0: Thus, even if it may exist a value of ^ beyond
which dp(i)=di  0, S(i) is still increasing for all i 2 [l; u].
This concludes the proof.
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